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Abstract
This paper presents an investigation into the market structure for three product types of 
salmon (smoked, fresh and whole salmon) in the UK retail market. Evidence of the po-
tential for market power and pricing conduct is analysed using structural simultaneous 
system equations based on the Bresnahan (1982) model.  The importance of the retail 
market is recognised given the dominance of supermarket chains which accounted for 
£1.6 billion sales of seafood and the share of about 87% of all seafood retail sales in 2004 
as compared with only 16% in 1988. The results indicate that the system is well repre-
sented by the models and that the market is competitive for fresh fillets and whole salmon 
but retailers exert some market power for smoked salmon. The hypothesis that market 
power is the same for all three products in the study was rejected; further indicating that 
retailers may be exercising market power for smoked salmon.
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Introduction
Rapid growth of the UK retail sector in the last 20-years has fueled an enormous change 
in the organization of relationships along the seafood marketing structure.  Changes in 
consumer buying habits with the increased demand for convenience food and the con-
sumption of more meals away from home are frequently cited in the literature as the natu-
ral causes of these transformations.  These changes have shifted the market from being 
unsophisticated into being highly technological and concentrated.  This concentration has 
been  brought  about  partly by  the  substantial  growth  in  the  production  of  intensively 
farmed salmon in Scotland, and partly by the increased dominance of supermarkets in 
retail sales. Mergers among supermarket chains and take-overs by multinational retail 
firms have led to supermarket dominance in the retail trade.  Supermarket sales of sea-
food at £1.6 billion for 2004 was up 9.6% on 2003 figures (Seafish Industry Authority, 
2004), and account for about 87% of all seafood retail as compared with only 16% in 
1988 (Murray and Fofana, 2002). Growth in supermarket sales has occurred at the ex-
pense of market stalls, fishmongers, retail vans and other independent retailers as de-
picted in Figure 1. Consequently, the supermarket is now the outlet of choice for most 
consumers, rather than the independent small retailer (e.g. fishmonger).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The motivations of this paper are closely linked to the developments that have occurred 
in the fish retailing industry in the last two decades and the dominance of supermarkets in 
retailing of seafood products in the UK. These developments have raised concerns that 
supermarkets may be exercising market power. This allegation has been expressed by 
consumer  groups  and  newspapers  such  as  Fish  Farming  Today,  No.  180  November, 
(2003) and Sunday Times, 23 August (1998)). A number of recently published books
1
                                                
1 “Shopped” by Joanna Blythman and “Not on the Label” by Felicity Lawrence
New Economics Foundation – “Clone Town Britain” 
http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads/mrrefr55lroqjwrefpvg525528082004130712.pdf  4
about multiple retailers’ growth and dominance also document the growing public con-
cern of the spiralling power of the supermarket retail chains. 
Concerns over the dominance and potential market power was one of the factors that led 
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)  in the UK prompted the Competition Commission (CC)  
to investigate UK supermarket sector, the report of which was released in 2000. The CC’s 
analysis covered both the supermarkets’ relationships with suppliers and the extent to 
which the downstream market was competitive. The investigation included an analysis of 
price trends over time, international price comparisons, profitability, and consumer satis-
faction. The CC concluded that there was no evidence of excess prices or profits, and that 
the market was ‘broadly competitive’.  In early 2006, the OFT again  referred the retail 
industry to the CC for more detailed investigation due to further consolidation in the re-
tail market since 2000. The OFT is particularly concerned that increased consolidation 
and the move by supermarkets into the convenience sector could reasonably be suspected 
to distort competition and harm consumers.
The question of competition and market power come together in considerations of domi-
nant firms and in the chain they operate. High market concentration and shares are com-
monly associated with the exercise of market power (Burt and Sparks (2003)). Therefore 
a concept central to the industrial organization literature is that increased concentration 
leads to increased market power, while less concentration increases the disciplines on in-
dustry’s pricing strategy. Disadvantaging competitors by offering lower prices to suppli-
ers provides a benefit that allows dominant firms to increase market share or prices. In 
the literature a number of possible ways of raising costs can be identified, including sup-
ply agreements, exclusive dealing, wage deals, compliance costs, advertising, develop-
ment service enhancements and vertical integration.  All or some of these tactics have 
been  ascribed  to  the  operation  of  multiple  retailers  and  supermarkets  (Smith  (2002), 
Clarke et al. (2002)). 5
In a recent article, Jaffry,  Fofana and Murray (2003) carried out a study of the retail 
market for fresh salmon fillets in the UK using data for the industry from 1992-2000. 
Their work was motivated by the recent questions about claims that supermarket chains 
use their buying power to obtain substantial discounts from suppliers but fail to pass these 
benefits on to consumers. Using single demand and supply equations, Jaffry et al ana-
lysed the chain between the retailers and consumers for the fresh salmon fillets using the 
New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) methodology. The study revealed that the 
retail market for fresh salmon fillet is competitive despite the market being highly con-
centrated. However, the study does not imply that market power is not being applied to 
other product forms such as smoked salmon fillets or whole salmon at retail level. 
Since the late 1980s, application of the NEIO to estimating the extent of market power 
has become very popular. Recent developments in time series economics have further 
enhanced empirical investigation of market power using the NEIO methodology.   In this 
methodology, correct specification of the demand process is crucial. While most applica-
tions of this method have been restricted to single markets, Cotterill, Dhar and Putsis 
(2000), Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994)   and Hyde and Perloff (1998), among others 
have used system demand equations to overcome the theoretical shortcomings of single 
demand  equation  in  determining  market  power.  Hyde  and  Perloff  (1998)  developed 
cross-markets investigation of market power for meat using a linearised form of AIDS 
model. 
In this paper an economic model of firm conduct similar to that of Hyde and Perloff 
(1998) is used to measure explicitly the degree of competitive behaviour in the retailing 
of salmon products in the UK. This approach yields precise, interpretable statistical tests 
to evaluate the degree of market power in salmon retailing. While the approach used in 
this paper is similar to that of Hyde and Perloff, it is more robust in that the time series
properties of the data are accounted for in the construction of the LAIDS model. The 
marginal cost equation in this article also differs from that of Hyde and Perloff in that we 6
included a variable that captures price of capital for retailing and tests are conducted for 
the legitimacy of the instruments used in the estimation. The modelling approach also 
differs from previous salmon retail market power studies in the UK that uses single de-
mand models (e.g. Jaffry et al. (2003)).
1. Model formulation
The key to measuring market power using the NEIO methodology is the consistent esti-
mation of demand and cost models.  Therefore, we first specify a system demand model 
estimated and then derive the optimality equations following Hyde and Perloff (1998).
1.1 Demand Systems
The first stage in the estimation of market power is to specify and estimate a model that 
describes consumer demand. The key to any demand estimation is to specify a model that 
is both flexible and consistent with economic theory.  The linear form of the AIDS has 
enjoyed great popularity in applied demand analysis due to its consistency and ease of 
estimation.  Starting from a specific cost function with the basic assumption that com-
modities are weakly separable from non-related goods, the AIDS model gives the share 
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z   is the budget share of the i
th good, pjt are prices of the j
th good in the 
bundle, xt is total expenditure on all goods in the system and pt is the index of prices in 
time period t.  The index of prices pt is assumed to be a function of commodity prices and 
is defined as a translog price index of the form:
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i p is the mean of the series used as the base period.  To keep the model consistent 
with economic theory, the parameters are constrained such that the homogeneity, adding-
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Therefore we estimate own price and expenditure elasticities of the three product forms 
included in the study. The uncompensated own price  ii   and income   i   elasticities of 
demand (Green and Alston, 1990) are calculated as follows 












Calculating elasticities, the budget shares are ideally the predicted shares at the estima-
tion point.  However, Chalfant (1987) indicated that the use of the corresponding sample 















1.2 Optimality condition 
As highlighted by Hyde and Perloff (1998), Bresnahan (1982) showed that a suitable way 
of generating an entire family of possible equilibria is to equate marginal cost with a 
measure of effective marginal revenue. This is mathematically given as follows 
  i q i q i p i λ i p MR    (3)
where q is quantity, p is price and the  term is a parameter to be determined and captures 
the degree of market power in the industry for all goods i = 1, ..., n. Theoretically,   term 
takes a value between 0 and 1 ( 1 λ 0   ) and if  equals zero perfect competition exists. 
If  is equal to 1 the industry behaves as a cartel. Intermediate  values identify different 
oligopoly regimes.  In general, the optimality condition in (3) can be rewritten for good i
as 
  i i
i
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where    i q MC  is  a formulation for the marginal cost function which is the first deriva-
tive of the total cost function. The procedure summarised in equation (4) has been applied 
in many single market studies (see for example Jaffry et al (2003) and Steen and Salvanes 
(1998) for specific examples on the application to salmon markets. Hyde and Perloff 
(1998) generalised equation (4) to study several markets simultaneously. Following the 
same vein, we generalised equation (4) to study several product markets simultaneously.   
Some authors have interpreted   as conjectural variation, in this paper we have followed   
Perloff (1992) as the wedge between price and marginal cost created by an unknown 
game.
To extend Hyde and Perloff (1998) analysis, we included a variable, k, which is a proxy 
index that captures the price associated capital and other utilities faced by all retail outlets 9
as part of the determinant of marginal costs.
2  The k variable in the marginal cost equa-
tion emphasises the asymmetry in costs that can exist between the incumbent large retail 
firms and potential entrants in the market. Supermarkets have used this advantage to cut 
prices to lure customers and by so doing moving away from short run to long run profit 
maximization objectives.  These strategies are designed to increase market share, protect 
market position in the long run and act as a barrier strategically to deter potential entrants 
in the industry. The evaluation of competitive markets and market behaviour often fo-
cuses on the extent to which one or more firms can sustain a price increase. Firms will 
find it very difficult to sustain significant long-term price increases if it is easy for new 
firms to enter a market and provide a substitute product or service.  The existence of bar-
riers to market entry will limit such market responses. There are many types of barrier to 
entry in different markets. Bain (1956) identified absolute cost advantage
3 and economies 
of large scale  production  that require large  capital  expenditure as among the  general 
sources of barrier to entry in an industry.  Bain argued that a barrier to entry is a struc-
tural attribute of a market implying that incumbent sellers can earn more than a normal 
rate of return without attracting new entrants into the industry.  For example, the cost of 
land is a significant part of costs in the UK. The Competition Commission (2000) re-
ported that the five main supermarkets in the UK paid more to acquire land for develop-
ment than their counterparts in other European countries.   Along these lines the Compe-
tition Commission (2000) examined development costs of land in France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands. The analysis suggests that development costs in the UK were typically 
2.5 times higher than in France; 1.6 times higher than in Germany and 2.7 times higher 
than Netherlands.  Therefore k which is an index of the price of capital and other utilities 
is a key variable in the cost structure of large retail organizations in the UK and it is vital 
to uncover any anticompetitive behaviour. 
                                                
2 Steen and Salvanes (1998), Park and Weliwita (1999), Jaffrey, Fofana and Murray (2003) included meas-
ures of capital cost in the marginal cost equations in determining oligopoly power.
3 Absolute cost advantage is used to describe a number of potential cost advantages that incumbents may 
have over new entrants, other than economies of scale.10
Following Hyde and Perloff (1998), constant returns to scale is assumed so as to allow 
the possibility of detecting other forms of market structures.  In this vein, marginal cost 
for each good reflects constant returns to scale and is linear in wholesale prices, wages 
and price of capital as shown in the following equation.
  k w v q MC i i i i i i e d b a     (5)
where  i v  is the wholesale price of each fish product;  w is an index of retail wage costs 
common for all salmon products and k is a measure of capital cost common to all retail 
outlets in the industry.   i a , i b ,  i d and  i e  are parameters to be estimated. Similar marginal 
cost representations have also been used by Deodhar and Sheldon (1995) and Hatirl et al 
(2003).
Taking first differential  of the  LAIDS model  holding total  expenditure (x)  and other 






























where  ij   refers to the Kronecker delta. In the salmon retail market retailers stock most 
of the product forms for salmon.  In the case where each firm sells all three goods, as we 
















Substituting (5) and (6) into the optimality condition (7), with some mathematical ma-
nipulations yields the following equation used in the estimation.
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where pi is the retail price of salmon product i, vi is the wholesale price, w is an index of 
the retail wage rates, q is the quantity sold, z is the budget share,  and  are coefficients 
from the LAIDS model and a, b, c, d, e and  are parameters to be estimated. As evident 
from equation (8), an integral part of the optimality condition which depicts the indus-
try’s pricing behaviour is the elasticity concept which is the conduct coefficient ( ). The 
  parameter measures a gap created by some unknown game as could be the case in a 
folk-theorem equilibrium that lies between the collusive and Cournot equilibria (Hyde 
and Perloff (1998)).Thus the model involves a kind of pseudo-dynamics depicted in a 
framework that is essentially static.
4  More recently, the appearance of studies in the lit-
erature have tested the validity of static oligopoly models (e.g., Nevo (2001); Hausman 
and Leonard (2000); Genesove and Mullin (1998); Wolfram (1999)). Most of these stud-
ies suggest that the seemingly static oligopoly models yield reasonably accurate predic-
tions of pricing behaviour. The conduct coefficient will reveal what kind of oligopolistic 
behaviour that characterizes the market, and there is no need to impose any a priori re-
striction on it. That is, it is not necessary to assume a certain conduct beforehand, and test 
for its propriety. Instead, any behavioural model is a priori plausible.
2.0 Data and Empirical Modelling
Salmon retail data for smoked, fillets and whole salmon were collected from Seafish In-
dustry Authority  and the  production and wholesale  data were obtained  from Scottish 
Quality Salmon (SQS).
5 Quantity-value transformation was used to derive unit prices per 
kilogram.  Asche et al (2001) argues the significant price reductions of new aquaculture 
species indicates that the markets for these species are not strongly linked to the markets 
for other products. As perfect substitutes have a constant relative price and close substi-
tutes have highly correlated prices, this suggests that farmed fish does not compete too 
                                                
4Although derived in a static context, these tests provide a valid empirical test of dynamic equilibrium
(Worthington (1990)). Consequently we do not introduce any dynamics in the optimality model during es-
timation.12
closely with other goods.  Therefore data for substitute products were excluded from the 
analysis.
Wage  (w) in the marginal cost equation is an index of wage costs of retailers, based on a 
continuous surveys conducted by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) in which 
over 12, 500  samples are selected annually.  Price capital variable (k) in the marginal 
cost equation is an index of rent, which includes maintenance, insurance, ground rent, 
council tax, water rates, mortgage, building maintenance and an interest payment index; 
collected from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), UK. 
The data available for empirical modelling are monthly figures from January 1992 to De-
cember 2003. Table 1 summarises and presents descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in the estimation procedure.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Although monthly data were available we follow Genesove and Mullin (1998) in aggre-
gating up to quarterly level. Genesove and Mullin argued that this was to ensure that the 
estimated elasticity represents the long run elasticity as opposed to short run. In addition, 
the long run is considered because under imperfect competition, retailers are more likely 
to establish a price in the long-run rather than short-run profits in mind and to maintain 
that price for a considerable period of time (Juma, (2004)).  Before specifying the most 
appropriate empirical model the time series properties of the data were reviewed in order 
to  investigate  formally  whether  the  long  run  demand  relationships  are  economically 
meaningful or merely spurious. 
                                                                                                                                                
5SQS is an industry body that represents Scottish Salmon Growers Association, the Scottish Salmon Board 
and Scottish Quality Salmon. A new expanded trade association, Scottish Salomon Producer Organisation, 
was created in 2006 that has taken over the operations of SQS.13
First, each of the individual time series is tested for a unit root in the demand equations. 
Unit root testing was implemented using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The 
tests are conducted with and without a trend term and the results indicated that the con-
structed series for fresh fillets, whole and smoked fillets were all non-stationary in levels 
but stationary in first differences, a necessary condition for cointegration. 
The second step was to investigate whether both  i z  and the vector of explanatory vari-
ables in each demand equation are cointegrated. This test was implemented using Johan-
son’s (1988) approach, a vector auto-regressive model. This test is important because the 
demand model specified would be inappropriate if the variables do not have a long run 
relationship or are not cointegrated. The results show that there is at least one cointegra-
tion vector in the share equation,  i z  for each salmon product forms. The results are pre-
sented in table 2 below.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Having found that all variables in the LAIDS model are I(1) and there is at least one coin-
tegrating vector in each of the share equation implies that the LAIDS model must be es-
timated in a way that accounts for these properties. The estimation of the LAIDS model 
using integrated data has been addressed using a number of methods. For example, Ng 
(1995) specifically considers the issue of testing the homogeneity restriction and uses a 
method in which the empirical distribution of the relevant test statistics are simulated by 
parameterising the data generating process and using this as the basis for a Monte Carlo 
exercise. The most commonly used method in fish demand analysis is the Anderson and 
Blundell (1982) technique as exemplified by Asche et al. (1997). Therefore following 
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E  , 
j p ... it z Δ4 …. ik s  are seasonal dummies, t a linear trend,  t   is the error term. The use of a 
trend is quite common in demand analysis, for example see Burton and Young, (1996), 
Asche et al. (1997). The trend term in the equation is assumed to capture several factors. 
First,  marketing  of  salmon  especially  by  SQS  in  the  media  to  promote  salmon  as  a 
healthy diet to counteract negative publicity about salmon farming has intensified since 
the creation of the industry body. The activities of the industry body and similar organi-
zations that promote oily fish have drawn attention to salmon products. Second, the trend 
also captures structural shifts in demand and changes in taste. 
Like Asche et al., we are not able to separate the trend and the constant terms in equation 
(10) thus estimated are not interpreted as minimum expenditure on each salmon product. 
The filter in equation (10) has been argued to control for both deterministic and stochastic 
seasonal trends in the model (Asche et al., 1997).  The fourth difference filter is prefer-
able in with quarterly data to the normal first difference filter because it controls both for 
seasonal cycles and for unit roots such that the short-run dynamics in the data series are 
stationary.  Following Anderson and Blundell (1983) and Burton and Young (1996), the 
properties  of  homogeneity  and  symmetry  are  applied  in  the  long-run segment  of  the 
model.  While symmetry may not hold in the short run, homogeneity holds by the virtue 
of the adding up properties. One lag was sufficient to account for the dynamics and the 
effects of habit formation in the model.
3.0 Empirical Results
To accommodate the large number of parameters in equations (8) and (10) and the atten-
dant multicollinearity problems the demand system equations and the system of equilib-
rium conditions were estimated sequentially.
6  The demand system (8) was estimated us-
                                                
6  In all, we attempted to estimate five equations system with demand theoretical restrictions imposed using 
non linear three- stage least square to achieve maximum efficiency.  Unfortunately we were not able to 15
ing a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique, which accounts for cross-equation 
contemporaneous correlation and as a result takes into account the optimization process 
that is essential in any demand system.   The demand system is estimated by incorporat-
ing the theoretical restrictions of adding-up, symmetry and homogeneity. Following An-
derson and Blundell (1982), one equation (we dropped the whole salmon share equation) 
was dropped to avoid singularity during estimation  and the adding-up restriction was 
used to recover the equation after estimation. The estimated parameters are reported in 
Table 3[Insert Table 3 Here]
The model specification is robust and fits the observed data for both product forms as 
measured by system R-square
1 of 87%. The hypotheses of homogeneity and symmetry 
conditions implied in economic theory are tested with a Wald test. The computed test sta-
tistics for symmetry restriction is 10.4 and the tabulated 
2   statistics is 3.84 for one de-
gree of freedom, which allowed the rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level of signifi-
cance. On the other hand, the homogeneity restriction was accepted at the 5% level of 
significance. The corresponding computed value of the test statistics for homogeneity is 
4.60 and the tabulated 
2   statistics for 2 degrees of freedom is 5.99.  The rejection of the 
symmetry condition found in this study is not unusual. This implies that empirical de-
mand  studies  often  found  that  some  theoretical  restrictions  do  not  hold  (Deaton  and 
Muellbauer 1980b, Cozzarin and Gilmour 1998). Cozzarin and Gilmour conducted a sur-
vey on these restrictions in empirical demand studies and found homogeneity (symmetry) 
was tested in 29 of the models and the restriction was rejected 57% percent of the time. A 
joint test for homogeneity and symmetry were also conducted. The computed test statis-
                                                                                                                                                
achieve convergence in that case may be due to large number of parameters to be estimated. However a 
number of market power studies have used sequential estimation method (e.g. see Steen and Salvanes, 
(1999); Gohin and Guyomard, (2000); Jaffry et al, (2003).16
tics is 6.12 and the corresponding critical value at 5% level of significance is 7.82, which 
means that we can’t reject the null of a joint homogeneity and symmetry restriction.  
We use the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) to test for the presence of autocorrelation.   In the 
LM test the null hypothesis of  0 : H i 0   (no autocorrelation) is tested against the alter-
native hypothesis of the presence of autocorrelation. The LM test has a 
2  distribution 
with degrees of freedom equivalent to the number of lagged residuals. Using the afore-
mentioned test the computed 
2   statistics are 0.13 and 0.22 and the tabulated critical is 
5.99 for 2 degrees of freedom. The test suggests that there is no problem of autocorrela-
tion detected in both estimated share equations. Following from the results obtained, the 
results indicate that the system model estimated for retail demand for salmon possess 
both theoretical properties of homogeneity and symmetry. 
The economic content of the LAIDS model is presented in Table 4 in terms of elasticities. 
The own price elasticities have correct signs (negative) according to the economic theory. 
Estimates of elasticity in the retail market for different salmon products in the UK are not 
commonly reported in the literature except for fresh fillets. Compared with earlier studies 
of salmon market in the UK, the results of this study appear in line with fresh fillets esti-
mates reported in the past. For example Clay and Fofana (1999) and Jaffry et al. (2003) 
reported own price elasticity estimate values of –0.33 and –0.62 for fresh salmon fillets. 
It is interesting to note that our calculations indicate that whole salmon is relatively more 
elastic compared with fresh fillets or smoked salmon.   This is typical of unprocessed 
food, meaning that a slight increase in the price of whole salmon triggers higher than 
proportionate decrease in demand. Unlike smoked or fresh fillet which are to some de-
gree processed and higher value goods and therefore a slight increase in price would not 
change demand a great deal.  Also worth noting is that the elasticity estimate for fresh 
salmon fillets appears to be increasing in value with time.  This trend indicates the inde-
pendence of consumers and that the market demand curve is gradually disciplining the 17
market. That is customers react more strongly in later years to changes in price as com-
pared with earlier years; this is a sign of competitiveness in the industry.
[Insert Table 4 Here]18
The own price elasticities for smoked and fresh fillets of –0.88 and –1.02 are not signifi-
cantly different from (minus) one, implying that consumers almost make proportional 
responses in the quantity demanded when the prices of these products change. However, 
the own price elasticity for whole salmon (-1.49) depicts elastic demand. All other things 
remaining unchanged, if the price of whole salmon in the retail market increases by 10% 
consumers cut back on the quantity demanded by almost 15%. This adjustment by con-
sumers for whole salmon is not surprising for a product that is unprocessed and mostly 
displayed on wet fish counters in supermarkets, thus competing directly with other un-
processed fish products.   The expenditure elasticities are statistically significant indicat-
ing that total expenditure on salmon products is a significant determinant of the demand 
for all the product forms of salmon that were investigated. However, we note the elastic-
ities  estimates  are  not  significantly  different  from  one  for  smoked  fillets  and  whole 
salmon.  The expenditure elasticity for fresh fillets is, however, greater than one indicat-
ing that demand is expenditure elastic. Earlier studies of salmon in the 1980s to mid 
1990s typically estimated higher expenditure elasticity values as compared those found in 
this study. Our estimates are dissimilar from earlier studies due to recent changes in the 
market and the demand structure for salmon. These changes are fuelled by marked shifts 
in food consumption patterns due to changing lifestyle of the UK consumer, along with 
economic, social and demographic changes. Furthermore, the demand system specifica-
tion and the estimation techniques used in this article are more robust in contrast to many 
earlier studies when the market was immature. Thus, the results in this study are similar 
for income to comparable elasticities of Asche et al. (1997), Clay and Fofana (1999) and 
Jaffry et al. (2003).  On the whole, the elasticity estimates are plausible and meaningful 
and further lend support to the satisfactory nature of the LAIDS-ECM model estimated. 
Due to  the non-linearity  of the system of equilibrium  conditions  (10), the non-linear 
three-stage least squares (NL3SLS) procedure with instruments is used for estimation. 
Initial starting value estimates were obtained in a two-stage estimation procedure using 19
an instrumental variable method to avoid simultaneity bias. The instruments used were 
GDP, time trend, UK money supply (M3), quarterly average of UK Banks' base interest 
rates, UK CPI, index of production by Standard Industry Classification (92) and an index 
of expenditure on food and non-alcoholic beverages.
7   Our estimates of the marginal cost 
equation for each product form and the corresponding market power estimates are pre-
sented in Table 5.
A key problem with instrumental variable is that instruments are required which are at 
least asymptotically uncorrelated with the error term in the regression equation. In order 
to test the validity of the instruments we used a Sargan (1964) validity test of instru-
ments. Under the null hypothesis, the Sargan statistic is asymptotically distributed as 
2 
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where W is the chosen matrix of instruments, p indicates the number of columns in W 
and k the number of parameters to be estimated. The test statistics were 1.98, 1.95 and 
8.14 for smoked fillet, fresh fillet and whole salmon marginal cost equations respectively. 
From the results, we accept the validity of instruments for all the marginal cost equations 
when compared with the critical value of 9.49 for 4 degrees of freedom and 5% level of 
significance.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
                                                
7 GDP, CPI, index of productivity, and Index of expenditure on food and non-alcoholic 
beverages were collected from the Office for National Statistics.  M3 and base interest 
rate were obtained from the Bank of England.20
The model fits the data well with satisfactory R
2 values.  An autocorrelation test (DW 
test) was performed to check for the existence of autocorrelation in each of the marginal 
cost equation. The results also suggest that no autocorrelation in these equations.
Considering the effects of the retail wage rate on retail marginal cost, these were found to 
be of minimal impact with those for salmon steak and whole salmon not being statisti-
cally significant. This effect was as expected in that the retail wage rate is generally close 
to the minimum wage. More importantly however is the fact that employees in the retail 
sector have little influence on their wage rates and are therefore price-takers. With respect 
to the market power parameters,, these were found not to be significant at the 5% sig-
nificance level for fresh fillet and whole salmon but significant for smoked salmon. More 
importantly however, is that the market power estimates for fresh fillet and whole salmon 
are close to zero for us to conclude that the market for these products is near perfectly 
competitive. However, in relative terms the market power estimate for smoked salmon is 
significant and of higher magnitude as compared with other two products. This suggests 
that retailers exercise some degree of market power for smoked fillet.  Furthermore, the 
corresponding Lerner index
8 for smoked salmon is 0.0127 while the estimated indixes for 
fillets and whole salmon are 0.0001 and 0.0002 respectively.  It can be seen that the 
Lerner indexes for fresh fillet and whole salmon were negligible and sufficiently close to 
zero to indicate that they are competitive while the value for smoked salmon was differ-
ent from zero suggesting some relative degree of market power. 
We also tested whether the retail marginal cost function and the market power parameter 
for each salmon product are identical.  The Wald test statistics for identical marginal cost 
function is 18.54 and the corresponding tabulated value is 12.59 for 6 degrees of freedom 
and 5% level of significance. The test clearly rejects the hypothesis that the marginal cost 
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functions of each salmon product are equal. This further shows that there are physical as 
well as cost differences between the different products of salmon that affects retail mar-
ginal costs. The cost differences are reflected in the degree to which each product form is 
processed, i.e. smoked fillet is highly processed while whole salmon is the least proc-
essed. This leads to the existence of different variable cost structures associated with dif-
ferent market structures, higher costs being associated with non-competition. The Wald 
test statistics for equal market power measure for each product form is 8.44 and the cor-
responding tabulated value is 7.82 for 3 degrees of freedom at the 5% level of signifi-
cance. These results further show that the market power estimates for each salmon prod-
uct are not identical, lending support to the notion that retailers might be exercising some 
degree of market power for smoked fillet. 
Indeed there are reasons in the industry to suggest that retailers of smoked salmon fillet 
might have some degree of market power. Salmon or indeed fish processing in the UK 
industry is a mature and conservative one based on traditional practices with some meth-
ods of processing still unaltered by recent technological innovations. A survey conducted 
by the UK Sea Fish Industry Authority in 2000 revealed that close to 40% of primary 
processors either have no internet web site or do not use computers even in basic tasks in 
their businesses, such as book-keeping or inventory purposes. Moreover, there has been 
more consolidation, liquidations and rationalization of salmon smoking firms or activities 
within firms than any other firms specialising in other forms of processing of salmon. 
4.0 Conclusions
Salmon  products  have  now  become  affordable  to  the  ordinary  consumer  despite  the 
highly concentrated channels by which the supplies are obtained. In order to gain an un-
derstanding of the transformation of the retail sector for salmon products, we applied a 
new approach in Industrial Economics to the salmon retail market. The methodology, un-
like its predecessors, is theoretically more robust.  Modeling the formation of prices in 
the market, we estimated an ECM LAIDS model that is claimed to approximate con-22
sumer behaviour. This is the first study to use such a model within a structural economet-
ric framework of firms to test for market power for salmon products in the UK.  Applying 
these models to salmon products at the retail level yields robust demand and marginal 
cost models with theoretically acceptable model diagnostics, suggesting that the system is 
well represented. The empirical results were derived with data for 1992-2003 and the re-
sults show competitive pricing behaviour in general but that the retailer might have some 
degree of market power for smoked salmon fillet. Largely the findings from this study 
support previous findings (Jaffry et al (2003); Steen and Salvanes, (1999)). In addition, 
our findings support the claims made by supermarkets in the UK, that, regardless of their 
huge market share and high concentration, retail sales for salmon remain competitive. 23
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable description Coefficient Mean Standard deviation 
Demand equation:
  Budget Share
    Smoke salmon 
t z1 0.18 0.04
    Salmon fillet
t z2 0.51 0.21
    Whole salmon
t z3 0.31 0.22
 Price
    Smoke salmon  11  13.17 3.37
    Salmon fillet 22  6.13 0.87
    Whole salmon
33  3.12 0.62
  Expenditure  7.90 0.55
Marginal cost equation:
Wholesale price  of smoked salmon 1 v 11.13 2.87
Wholesale price  of salmon fillet 2 v 3.63 1.62
Wholesale price  of  whole  salmon 3 v 2.64 0.79
Price of labour (wage index) w 100.56 8.99
Capital cost (index) e 190.01 30.36















Max  Trace 















  LnPsmoked  -1.25 -2.17 -5.29
a -5.22
a
  lnPfresh fillet -2.32 -1.82 -5.06
a -5.06
a
  LnPwhole -0.82 -1.68 -6.59
a -6.46
a
  Ln(Exp) -0.77 -3.11 -4.70
a -4.61
a
 asignificant at 1% level, 
bsignificant at 5%.28
Table 3: Estimated Parameters of an LAIDS-ECM for Retail Salmon Products
Share Equation Smoked Fillets Fresh Fillets
Variable Parame- t –ratio Parame- t -ratio




∆4 Smoked Fillett 0.262
c 1.62 -0.255
b -1.95
∆4 Fresh Fillett -0.520
c -1.47 0.478
 c 1.68
∆4 Wholet -0.122 -1.04 0.210
b 2.23
∆4  Expendituret 0.034 0.76 -0.014 -0.38
∆4 Smoked Fillett-1 0.055 0.32 -0.256
b -1.86
∆4 Fresh Fillett-1 0.466







Smoked Fillett-5 (zt- 0.381 0.57 -0.655 -1.23
Fresh Fillett-5 (zt-5) 0.647 1.07 -0.769
c -1.60
Wholet-5 (zt-5) 0.729 1.07 -0.815
c -1.52
Smoked Fillett-5  0.016 0.68 -0.260 -1.29





Expendituret-5 -0.004 1.26 0.139
 c 1.75
S1 -0.008 -0.27 0.007 0.30
S2 -0.028 -0.74 0.015 0.50






     b significant at 5% level;  
c significant at 10% level











Smoked Fillet   0.98
a 3.75




a significant at 1% level29
Table 5: Parameter Estimates for Marginal Costs Equations
Con- V W K  R
2 DW




(0.67) (1.51) (1.12) (1.30) (-2.18)
Fresh Fillet -0.004 0.412
b 0.001
b -0.0004
 b -0.0001 0.73 1.48




b -0.0003 0.75 1.42
(1.48) (1.25) (2.32) (2.32) (-0.92)
V=wholesale prices; W=index of retail wage; =market power measure, K= index of 
capital cost, DW=Durbin-Watson test statistics; student t-test statistics in parenthesis. 
b 
significant at 5% , 
c significant at 10% level
Figure
Figure 1: Value of fish sales by outlet
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